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FACES OF OPEN COURTS AND THE CIVIL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Steven D. Schwinn t

Most state bills of rights are longer than the first ten
Amendments, containing rights and guarantees not found in
the Federal Constitution.
The most widespread and
important of these unique state provisions is probably the
guarantee of a ri¥ht of access to the courts to obtain a
remedy for injury.
"It has long been recognized that equal access to the courts, and
modes of procedure therein, constitute basic and fundamental rights.
The courts must be open to all on the same terms without prejudice.,,2

1.

INTRODUCTION

The quest to establish a civil right to counsel, or "Civil Gideon,,,3 is
largely defined in relation to Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services. 4 In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that an
indigent parent subject to a state-initiated termination-of-parentalrights proceeding was not entitled to court-appointed counsel under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The Lassiter
Court ruled that other, future indigent civil litigants may be entitled to
court-appointed counsel, but only if they can show that the balance of
the familiar three-part procedural due process test in Mathews v.
t

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to
thank the members of the University of Baltimore Law Review for hosting this
important symposium on the civil right to counsel, "Civil Gideon," and for their
outstanding editorial work on this piece. All errors, of course, are my own. The
author also wishes to thank symposium keynote presenter Stephen H. Sachs and copanelists Debra Gardner and John Ebbott for a stimulating discussion that contributed
to the development of this article.
Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309,
1310 (2003).
Thayerv. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Okla. 1980).
"Civil Gideon" refers to the categorical constitutional right to appointed counsel in a
civil case, comparable to that same right in a criminal trial under Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
452 U.S. 18 (1981).
ld.at31,33.
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Eldridge 6 outweighs the newfangled, Court-created "presumption"
against appointment of counsel, except in cases where physical
liberty is at stake. 7
The upshot of Lassiter is that Civil Gideon instigators must show,
on a case-by-case basis, some combination of a very important
personal interest at stake in the litigation, a very unimportant
governmental interest at stake (or a governmental interest that aligns
with the personal interest, as in the best interest of the child in a
custody proceeding), and a very high likelihood of an erroneous
decision if the court fails to appoint counsel. 8 Even then, an indigent
litigant must show that the balance of these Mathews factors
outweighs the Lassiter "presumption" against counsel, except in
cases where physical liberty is at stake. 9 Only then will an indigent
litigant succeed in gaining court-appointed counsel under Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process. 10
Against this backdrop', Civil Gideon litigation strategies fall into
two camps. The first includes litigation that attempts to work
through Lassiter. In these cases, indigent litigants attempt to show
that the Mathews factors in their case overcome the Lassiter
"presumption." II Thus litigants attempt to show that their personal
interest in parenthood, housing, or personal safety, among others, is
very high-as close as possible to the privileged interest in physical
liberty. Next, they try to show that the governmental interest is
merely financial, or that it aligns with their personal interest. 12 And
finally, they attempt to show that the complexity of their case is such
that mistakes will be made if they lack legal representation. 13
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

424 u.s. 319,334-35 (1976).
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 ("If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their
strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at
their peak, it could not be said that the [Mathews] factors did not overcome the
presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not
therefore require the appointment of counsel. ").
See id. at 37.
See id. at 27.
Professor Bruce Boyer aptly describes Lassiter as a "scourge" for this and other
reasons. Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free
Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services of Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 635, 636 (2005).
See infra note 14.
Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in
Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 557, 588 (2006).
See, e.g., id. at 557 (arguing that plaintiffs in domestic violence cases satisfy the
Lassiter test). The American Bar Association has taken a position similar to this
approach. The ABA House of Delegates adopted a policy resolution on access to
civil justice that calls for "legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low
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This camp has seen some success,14 but it has two shortcomings.
First, this camp will never achieve a categorical constitutional right to
court-appointed counsel in civil cases-a true Civil Gideon-unless
the United States Supreme Court overrules Lassiter. 15 Lassiter has
established a case-by-case approach, and any victories are therefore
necessarily limited to that case. The civil doctrinal landscape under
Lassiter is thus precisely the same as the criminal landscape before
Gideon v. Wainwright. 16 Under Betts v. Brady,17 Gideon's precursor,
indigent criminal defendants had to show on a case-by-case basis that

14.

15.

16.
17.

income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child
custody, as determined by each jurisdiction." American Bar Association Task Force
on Access to Civil Justice, ABA Resolution on Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. &
C1v. RTS. L. REV. 507, 508 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/
sclaididownloads/06AI12A.pdf[hereinafter ABA Task Force] (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (lOth Cir. 1996) (holding that
petitioner had a due process right to counsel in a deprivation-of-parental-rights
proceeding); Kenny A. ex rei. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353,1357 (N.D. Ga.
2005) (holding that children have a due process right to counsel in deprivation and
termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, based upon their interests at stake);
S.C.D. v. Etowah County Dep't of Human Res., 841 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002) (finding that due process entitled parents to the right of counsel in a permanent
child deprivation proceeding); In re O.S., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1407 (2002)
(finding that a parent has a constitutional right to counsel); In re Powers, 624 N.W.2d
472,477-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a parent in a termination proceeding
has the right to counsel); In re Welfare of Luscier, 524 P.2d 906, 908 (Wash. 1974)
(holding that appointment of counsel was constitutionally required in permanent
deprivation proceedings for indigent parents); Marathon County Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. LH., 476 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding the parent was entitled to
counsel under the due process clause of the federal constitution). But see, e.g., In re
Travarius 0., 799 N.E.2d 510, 517 (III. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that petitioner had no
right to new counsel on a fourth occasion); In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d
1071, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that petitioner had no due process right to
counsel in a termination proceeding, but the same petitioner had an equal protection
right to counsel because similarly situated individuals under a different statutory
scheme had a statutory right to counsel); K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds County Dep't of
Human Servs., 771 So.2d 907, 911 (Miss. 2000) (holding that petitioner had no due
process right to counsel in a termination proceeding).
But c.f Balos, supra note II, at 591-96 (2006) (arguing that domestic violence cases
categorically satisfy the Lassiter test); Erik Pitchal, Children's Constitutional Right
to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & C1v. RTS. L. REv. 663, 670-82
(2006) (tracing the litigation that established the right to counsel for children in
dependency cases under Georgia's Due Process Clause and arguing that this
litigation stands for the proposition, following from an analysis of the Mathews
factors, that these children have a procedural due process right to counsel).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
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they were entitled to court-appointed counsel,18 and any victory was
therefore purely personal, limited to each defendant's case. Gideon
overruled Betts and held that indigent defendants subject to
incarceration in state criminal prosecutions have a categorical due
process right to counsel. 19
The other problem with this strategy is that litigants must always
deal in personal interests. Litigants must try to elevate or equate their
personal interests in their cases with the privileged interest in
physical liberty in order to overcome the "presumption" in Lassiter. 20
Because no personal interest has ever equated with physical liberty in
the Court's procedural due process jurisprudence,21 this is a very
difficult task to say the least. It is also risky. In making the claim,
Civil Gideon instigators risk a decision that situates the pertinent
personal interest significantly lower on the hierarchy than they
wished. This may set them back in other, unexpected ways, such as
claiming that the same interest is "fundamental" in a future, unrelated
case.
The second camp attempts to avoid these shortcomings by working
around Lassiter. This set of strategies seeks to dodge the first camp's
inevitable focus on personal interests by looking to alternative
constitutional arguments to establish Civil Gideon. Litigants have
thus turned to state constitutional arguments based on state due
process clauses that reject Lassiter's approach 22 and state equal

18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

Id. at 471-72 ("[W]e are unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated
in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the states, whatever may be their own views,
to furnish counsel in every [criminal case]. Every court has power, if it deems
proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of
fairness. ").
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
Professor Douglas Besharov poignantly illustrated one problem with Lassiter's focus
on interests and its priority of physical liberty: "Lassiter, for all practical purposes,
stands for the proposition that a drunken driver's night in the cooler is a greater
deprivation ofliberty than a parent's permanent loss of rights in a child." Douglas J.
Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to Counsel
After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981).
See ABA Task Force, supra note 13, at 513 (discussing the "additional presumption
against appointed counsel where there is no risk of loss of physical liberty[,]" and
stating that "[i]t is to be hoped that the U.S. Supreme Court will eventually
reconsider the cumbersome Lassiter balancing test and the unreasonable presumption
that renders that test irrelevant for almost all civil litigants."); Phillips, supra note I,
at 1318 n.34 (stating that the Supreme Court has not yet incorporated a remedy
guarantee into the Due Process Clause).
For examples of state courts' rejections of Lassiter under their respective state
constitutions, see K.P.B. v. D.C.A. (In re J.L.B.), 685 So. 2d 750, 752 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996) (rejecting Lassiter under the state constitution, and holding that an indigent
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protection clauses that ignore Lassiter's approach altogether. 23 Other
arguments in this camp seek to move toward a full Civil Gideon
indirectly, via an intermediate doctrinal step,24 or through judicial
strategies other than litigation. 25

23.

24.

25.

parent had a state constitutional right to counsel in a tennination proceeding); In re
K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 278, 282 (Alaska 1991) (rejecting Lassiter under the state
constitution, and holding that a parent had a state constitutional right to counsel in a
tennination proceeding); In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 260-62 (1983) (rejecting
Lassiter under the state constitution, and holding that an indigent parent had a state
constitutional right to counsel in a tennination proceeding); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127,
129-30 (1993) (holding that a parent had a state constitutional due process right to
appointed counsel in a proceeding to tenninate parental rights); see also Michael
Millemann, The State Due Process Justification Jor a Right to Counsel in Some Civil
Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & ClY. RTS. L. REV. 733, 746-57 (2006) (arguing that state due
process clauses provide a path to Civil Gideon in certain cases).
See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071, 1078-80 (III. App. Ct. 2000)
(holding that a litigant under the state Adoption Act, which did not provide for
appointed counsel, had a state constitutional equal protection right to counsel, where a
similarly situated litigant under the Juvenile Court Act would have had a statutory right
to counsel), ajJ'd, 763 N.E.2d 741 (III. 2002); In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d
558, 561, 566 (N.D. 1993) (holding that a litigant under the state Adoption Act, in
which the right to counsel was uncertain, had a state constitutional equal protection
right to counsel, where a similarly situated litigant under the Juvenile Court Act or the
Parentage Act had a certain statutory right to counsel). But see, e.g., In re Curtis S., 25
Cal. App. 4th 687, 692-93 (1994) (holding that an appellant who appealed a
tennination order in a private action had no equal protection right to counsel, even
though a similarly situated appellant in a state-initiated tennination case would have a
statutory right to counsel), abrogated by In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363, 371-72 (Cal. 2002)
(holding that an appellant who appealed a tennination order in a private action had no
statutory right to counsel, but declining to address the argument that failure to appoint
counsel in this situation violated the appellant's constitutional right to equal protection
of the law).
JOHN F. EBBOTT, KEVIN G. MAGEE & JACK W. EBBOTT, TOWARD A CIVIL GRIFFIN IN
WISCONSIN: EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 67-71 (2005)
[hereinafter TOWARD A CIVIL GRIFFIN] (arguing for Civil Gideon via the equal justice
principle in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), which held that when a criminal
defendant has a state-created right to appeal, the state may not deny this appeal solely
because the defendant is unable to afford a trial transcript). The equal justice
principle means "if the state makes a court-access remedy available, it cannot deny
that remedy to indigents solely because of their lack of means." Id. at 69. See also
Steven D. Schwinn, The Right to Counsel on Appeal: Civil Douglas, 15 TEMP. POL.
& CIv. RTS. L. REv. 603 (2005) (arguing for a constitutional civil right to counsel on
appeal as a step toward achieving Civil Gideon); Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a
"Civil Gideon" Under the Montana Constitution: Parental Rights as the Starting
Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81, 83 (2005) (arguing for Civil Gideon based on Montana's
open courts provision).
See, e.g., Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon Jrom the Dynamics
oj Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 697, 703-05 (2005) (arguing
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This article explores another state constitutional strategy within this
second camr: Civil Gideon under state constitutional "open courts"
provisions. 2 In essence, open courts provisions guarantee that state
courts will remain "open," that anyone harmed will have access to the
courts to seek a remedy for the harm, and that courts shall dispense
Maryland's open courts
justice freely, fully, and speedily. 27
provision, one of the earliest, is typical:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person
or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law
of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without
delay, according to the Law of the land. 28
Forty state constitutions contain an express open courts provision. 29
There are 32 different versions of the text,30 but they fall into two
broad categories. 31 The first is represented by Maryland's provision,
quoted above. The second version is represented by Justice Phillips's
composite "[t]hat all courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done him in his person, ~roperty or reputation, shall have
remedy by the due course of law." 2

26.

27.
28.
29.

30.

31.
32.

for a civil right to counsel by appealing to the administrative and bureaucratic
interests of the judiciary and its personnel).
See, e.g., Deborah Periuss, Washington's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases: Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 571,
573-74 (2004) (arguing for Civil Gideon based on Washington's open courts
provision).
See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES §§ 6-2 to 6-6 (4th ed. 2006).
MD. CONST. art. XIX.
Phillips, supra note 1, at 1310; Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to
Counsel for the Poor, 32 HUM. RTS., Summer 2005, at 8, 9 ("At least forty states
have similar open courts provisions.").
Professor Jennifer Friesen has counted 27 state constitutions
that require courts to be open, 36 that require justice to be
administered promptly, 27 that require justice to be administered
without purchase or sale, 34 that require justice to be granted
completely and/or without denial, and II that require justice to be
delivered freely. Additionally, 35 states provide a right to a
remedy, of which 21 require the remedy to be by due process or
due course oflaw.
Phillips, supra note 1, at 1310 n.7 (citing 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES app.
6 §§ 6-65 to 6-67 (3d ed. 2000)) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1310-11.
/d. at 1311.
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These clauses all derive from the open courts provisions in Magna
Carta,33 and many later-entering states adopted their open courts
provision directly from the open courts provisions in earlier state
constitutions. 34 There is little recorded history of the adoption of
these provisions, however. 35 And in the case of later-entering states,
there is often no history-just the text, copied verbatim from the
constitution of an earlier-entering state. 36 Thus, courts are left with
the bare text of these provisions and their historical roots in Magna
Carta in applying them.
And in applying open courts clauses, court rulings have been nearly
incomprehensible. Justice Phillips described the state of open courts
jurisprudence as follows:
These disparate results [among the courts' applications of
open courts provisions] are essentially inexplicable. They
cannot be harmonized by reliance on textual distinctions
among the states. There is no correlation between the words
of a particular guarantee and how expansively the courts of
that state have applied it. Nor can these different outcomes
be explained by historical, social, political, or cultural
variations among the states. . .. [S]ome state courts defer
unhesitatingly to legislative choices, while others routinely
strike down any statutes that impede access to the courts or
impair recovery under traditional theories. Finally, these
distinctions cannot be explained by divergent intentions
among the particular framers and ratifiers of the individual
state constitutions. In most states, there is almost no
historical record to explain what the framers and ratifiers
thought the provision would accomplish. 37

33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

See infra notes 51-86 and accompanying text.
Phillips, supra note 1, at 1315, 1323-24.
Id. at 1315.
See, e.g., Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 346 (Or. 2001)
(describing how Oregon's open courts provision was based on Indiana's earlier open
courts provision, which itself was based on yet earlier open courts provisions from
Ohio and Kentucky).
Phillips, supra note 1, at 1314-15; see, e.g., Daniel W. Halston, The Meaning of the
Massachusetts 'Open Courts' Clause and its Relevance to the Current Court Crisis,
88 MASS. L. REV. 122 (2004); Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The
Ongoing Search to Understand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS
L.J. 1005 (2001); Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of
the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REv. 1279 (1995); David
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1197 (1992).
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Notwithstanding the courts' incoherence in applying open courts
provisions to specific cases, some broad themes emerge from the
jurisprudence, which may be helpful in moving toward Civil Gideon
under open courts provisions. 38
For convenience in outlining these themes, I have divided open
courts provisions into two components: the "right to a remedy" and
the "access to justice."
The right-to-remedy component by its plain terms guarantees a
remedy in law for every wrong or harm. 39 Litigants use this
component to challenge restrictions on remedies, such as statutory
caps on remedies, immunities of parties or potential parties, and
statutes of limitations. 40 Two themes seem to emerge from these
cases. First, courts that consider open courts challenges to absolute
deprivations of causes of action look to the history of open courts
provisions, including their roots in Magna Carta, to determine
whether a restriction violates rights that were in existence when the
particular state's open courts provision was adopted and, if sOf
whether the legislature has provided a meaningful alternative. 4
Second, courts that consider open courts challenges to partial
deprivations of causes of action (such as damage caps or procedural
prerequisites) use a highly deferential means-ends test. 42
In contrast to the right-to-remedy component, the access-to-justice
component of open courts guarantees "open" courts and free, full,
and speedy justice. Litigants use this component to challenge
technical impediments to court access, such as filing fees and
attorney's fees. 43 Two themes also emerge from these cases. First,
courts that consider fee barriers or judicial restraints on access
usually adopt some form of a means-ends test and seem to privilege

38.
39.
40.

41.
42.

43.

Phillips, supra note I, at 1343-45.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
Phillips, supra note I, at 1311-12. See also Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d
7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986) (finding statutory limitation period unconstitutional, as applied
to minors); Oien v. City of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D. 1986)
(finding statutes granting sovereign immunity for municipalities in construction,
maintenance, and operation of parks unconstitutional); Lucas v. United States, 757
S.W.2d 687, 688-89, 691 (Tex. 1988) (invalidating statutory cap on medical
malpractice damages).
See Smothers, 23 P.3d at 357-62.
See, e.g., Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905-06 (Mo. 1992)
(finding statutes that placed cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice action did
not violate open courts provision of state constitution).
Phillips, supra note I, at 1312. See also Crocker v. Finley, 459 N.E.2d 1346, 1351
(Ill. 1984) (holding that imposing fee in excess of court filing fee is unconstitutional).
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an interest in judicial efficiency. 44 Second, courts that consider feeshifting or attorney's fee statutes use a varying means-ends test
depending on the nature of the statute. 45 The test privileges an
interest in equal access in those cases involving an asymmetrical feeshifting statute. 46
These trends--or the "faces" of open courts-are fodder for
arguments in favor of Civil Gideon. More particularly, some
combination of an historical argument (based on those right-toremedy cases involving a complete deprivation of a cause of action),
an equal access argument (based on those access-to-justice cases
involving attorney's fees), and a judicial efficiency argument (based
on those access-to-justice cases involving fee barriers and judicial
restraints on court access) provides a comprehensive open courts
argument for Civil Gideon.
This article first traces the history of open courts clauses. 47 Next, it
reviews the trends described above, looking at the trends in the rightto-remedy cases 48 and then in the access-to-justice cases. 49 Finally, it
provides some thoughts on arguments based on these trends that
move toward an open courts Civil Gideon. 5o
One important cautionary note: because open courts jurisprudence
across states (and even within individual states) is sometimes
unintelligible and incoherent, it is difficult to make any
generalizations about it. This article certainly makes no claim to
finding a grand theory of open courts rulings that reconcile them
across jurisdictions. Nor does the article claim to provide a
comprehensive analysis of open courts jurisprudence in any single
jurisdiction, or across all states. Instead, this article merely attempts
to sketch what appear to be some very broad trends in the open courts
jurisprudence with the hope that instigators might build upon and use
some of this analysis in their own work toward Civil Gideon.

44.
45.

46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

See, e.g., Crocker, 459 N.E.2d at 1352; Zamarron v. Pucinski, 668 N.E.2d 186, 19091 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
See, e.g., Florida Patient's Compo Fund V. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1149 (Fla. 1985)
(upholding post-litigation claims for attorney's fees because they encourage, rather
than deter, the pursuit of medical malpractice claims).
See, e.g., Thayer V. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d 1041, 1043-45 (Okla. 1980)
(the intent of an Oklahoma "statute imposing attorney fees on the defendant if the
plaintiff prevails is to preserve the ... accessibility of the ... court").
See infra Part II.
See infra Part lILA.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
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HISTORY

The state constitutional rights to a remedy and to open courts
originated with Magna Carta in June 1215, when King John agreed to
meet with rebellious barons at Runnymede to address their
grievances related to the Kin~'s abuse of power and infringement
upon their feudal jurisdiction. I In order to win back the barons'
loyalty, King John agreed to Magna Carta. 52
Magna Carta simply delineated the fundamental rights of
landowners of the time. It did not set down new rights; instead, it
defined existing rights, under the common law and ancient practices,
which had previously only been vaguely understood. 53 Thus, Magna
Carta merely restored the customary constraints on the King's
authority. 54
One of the barons' complaints involved King John's abuse of the
judicial process, including, among other abuses, the practice of
selling writs-the ticket for admission to the royal courts-at
inconstant prices in accordance with the value of the underlying
5l.

A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 7, 220 (1968) [hereinafter THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE]' Many outstanding sources trace this history of Magna Carta. See,
e.g., id. at 10-13 (tracing the influence of Magna Carta in AnglO-American political
thought and its restatement in U.S. federal and state constitutions); A.E. DICK
HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 3-8 (1964) [hereinafter TEXT
AND COMMENTARY] (providing a broad overview of the origins of Magna Carta,
outlining its seminal provisions and charting its ultimate incorporation into American
jurisprudence); WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON
THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN vii-viii, 48-122 (2d ed. 1914) (analyzing the
sixty-three chapters of Magna Carta in the context of the legal, political, economic,
and social life in thirteenth-century Great Britain); FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA:
ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 1300-1629, at 3-6 (1948)
(tracing the evolution of Magna Carta from the close of the reign of Edward I to the
death of Sir Edward Coke). This section draws substantially from two other
excellent histories and the respective sources cited therein. William C. Koch, Jr.,

Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration ofArticle

I. Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 333, 364-66 (1997);

53.

Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 341-42 (Or. 2001).
TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 51, at 8, 34-36.
See EDWARD COKE, A Proeme to the Second Part of the Institutes, in THE SECOND

54.

PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797).
The 1225 version of Magna Carta "was for the most part declaratory of the principall
grounds of the fundamentall laws of England, and for the residue it is additionall to
supply some defects of the Common Law; and it was no new declaration: for King
John in the 17 yeare of his raigne had granted the like, which also was called Magna
Charta, as appeareth by a Record before this Great Charter made by the King H.3."
Id. (alteration of original).
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 7.

52.
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claim or the wealth of the person seeking the writ. 55 For King John,
writs were a source of revenue;56 for would-be litigants, they
represented an illegitimate exercise of royal authority and a potential
barrier to the courts.
Chapters 39 and 40 of Magna Carta addressed the King's abuses of
judicial power. 57 Chapter 39 read: "No freeman shall be taken or
[and] imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor
will we go upon him nor send upon him, except bl the lawful
judgment of his peers or [and] by the law of the land.,,5 Chapter 40
specifically addressed the abuses in the writ system; it read: "To no
one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.,,59
A mere nine weeks after Magna Carta became law, King John
persuaded Pope Innocent II to annul it. 60 It reemerged under King
Henry III in 1216 and again in 1217 and 1224, each time with
But Chapters 39 and 40 remained
significant revisions. 61
substantially intact, even if merged into a new Chapter 29:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised
of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed,
or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass
upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right. 6i
This provision gained its relevance for U.S. constitutional law in
Sir Edward Coke's interpretation in his treatise, The Second Part of
the Institutes of the Laws of England (the "Second Institute,,)63 first
published in 1641, seven years after Coke's death. 64 Relying on
historical records, Coke's Second Institute traced the history of
Magna Carta since 1225 and explained its contemporary meaningnot the meaning in 1225. 65 He wrote this about Chapter 29:
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.
65.

MCKECHNIE, supra note 51, at 89, 395-96.
!d. at 72, 396-97.
ld. at 375-77, 395-96.
MAGNA CARTA ch. 39, reprinted in MCKECHNIE, supra note 51, at 375.
MAGNA CARTA ch. 40, reprinted in MCKECHNIE, supra note 51, at 395.
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 23 (5th ed.
1956).
GOLDWIN SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 136 (1955).
Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 340-41 (Or. 2001). See also
COKE, supra note 53, at 45.
See generally, COKE, supra note 53.
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 121.
THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 355.
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This is spoken in the person of the king, who in judgement
of Law, in all his Courts of Justice is present, and repeating
these words, Nulli vendemus, &c.
And therefore, every Subject of this Realme, for injury
done to him in bonis, terris, vel persona, by any other
Subject, be he Ecclesiasticall, or Temporall, Free, or Bond,
Man, or Woman, Old, or Young, or be he outlawed,
excommunicated, or any other without exception, may take
his remedy by the course of the Law, and have justice, and
right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully
without deniall, and speedily without delay.66
As one court wrote: "Coke asserted that the common law of
England had come to guarantee every subject a legal remedy for
injury to goods, lands, or person caused by any other subject.,,67
Coke's Second Institute was the primary source of understanding
Magna Carta in eighteenth century colonial America and thus
influenced early American constitutional thought. 68 It was not,
however, the only source. In 1687, William Penn published The
Excellent Priviledge of Liberty & Property Being the Birth-Right of
the Free-Born Subjects of England. 69 Penn's comments drew from
Coke's work,7o but he added this passage of his own, reflecting his
great enthusiasm for Chapter 29:
The 29th Chapter, NO FREE-MAN SHALL BE TAKEN,
&c. Deserves to be written in Letters of Gold; and I have
often wondred the Words thereof are not Inscribed in
Capitals on all our Courts of Judicature, Town-Halls, and
most pub lick Edifices; they are the Elixer of our English
Freedoms, the Store-house of all our Liberties. 71

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.

COKE, supra note 53, at 55-56 (alteration of original).
Smothers, 23 P.3d at 341.
See HOWARD, supra note 51, at 121-22.
WILLIAM PENN, THE EXCELLENT PRIVILEDGE OF LmERTY & PROPERTY BEING THE
BIRTH-RIGHT OF FREE-BoRN SUBJECTS OF ENGLAND (1687), reprinted in MAGNA
CARTA IN AMERICA 31 (David V. Stivison ed., 1993). See also THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 124.
Suzanne L. Abram, Problems oj Contemporaneous Construction in State
Constitutional Interpretation, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 613, 629-30 (2000).
PENN, supra note 69, at 61 (alteration of original). See also THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 63 (quoting DANIEL DULANY, THE RIGHTS OF THE
INHABITANTS OF MARYLAND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ENGLISH LAWS 14 (1728) ("The
29th chapter ... is not long, and ought to be read by every Body, and (in my humble
Opinion,) taught to Children, with their first Rudiments .... ")).
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In 1721, Henry Care published English Liberties in the colonies.72
Care also drew from Coke on the second sentence of Chapter 29,73
but added this:
[F]or Justice must have three Qualities, it must be Libera,
free; for nothing is more odious than Justice set to sale:
Plena, full, for Justice ought not to limp, or be granted by
piece-meal: And Celeris, speedy: Quia Dilatio est quedam
negatio, Delay is a kind of denial: and when all these meet,
it is both Justice and Right. 74
Finally, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England, first published in England in the 1760s,75 also influenced
American understanding of Mag,na Carta and, therefore, American
constitutional theory of the time. 6 Like Care and Penn, Blackstone
quoted Coke on Chapter 29 of Magna Carta 77 and added this:
A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of
applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries.
Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every
man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all
times be open to the subject, and the law be duly
administered therein. 78
For Blackstone, the "subordinate" right of access to the judiciary
meant only that access secured other substantive fundamental rights.
As one court summarized:
Blackstone echoed Coke in stating that it would be "in
vain" for the law to recognize rights, if it were not for the
remedial part of the law that provides the methods for
restoring those rights when they wrongfully are withheld or
invaded. To Blackstone, the guarantee of legal remedy for
injury "is what we mean properly, when we speak of the
protection of the law." Hence, the maxim of English law,

72.

HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE (5th
ed., Boston 1721).

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

[d. at 25-26.
[d. at 26 (alteration of original).
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1765-1769).
PLUCKNETT, supra note 60, at 287.
I BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 137.

[d. (alteration of original).
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Ubi jus, ibi remedium: "for every right, there must be a
remedy.,,79
American colonists saw themselves as Englishmen 80 and therefore
claimed to have brought the rights of Englishmen with them to the
colonies. 81 Magna Carta and the commentaries by Coke, Penn, Care,
and Blackstone were highly influential in their understanding of their
rights and the development of early American constitutions. 82 Penn
himself borrowed from Magna Carta, including Chapter 40 of the
1215 version, in drafting the Fundamental Law of West New Jersey
in 1676 and the Frame of Govemment of Pennsylvania in 1682. 83
Six of the original thirteen state constitutions contained provisions
derived from Chapter 40 of the earll versions of Magna Carta or
from Chapter 29 of the 1225 version. 8 Like other provisions in early
declarations and bills of rights, these early open courts provisions
were adopted to protect the new Americans from all abuses of power,
not merely abuses by the English Crown or Parliament. 85 Today
forty state constitutions contain some form of the open courts clause
modeled on these early provisions and ultimately derived from
Magna Carta. 86
In tracing this history, courts have made clear that open courts
provisions do not grant new rights. Instead, open courts provisions
protect rights that existed at the time of the adoption of the state's
open courts provision, or under the common law at the time. The
clauses protect against legislative infringement upon those ancient
rights, unless the legislature adopts a reasonable alternative to protect
those rights. Thus, the Supreme Court of Connecticut wrote:
We generally have held that [our open courts provision]
prohibits the legislature from abolishing or significantly
limiting common law and certain statutory rights that were
redressable in court as of 1818, when the constitution was
79.
80.
8!.
82.

83.

84.
85.
86.

Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 343 (Or. 2001) (citations omitted).
/d.
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 15-16.
/d. at 119-25; Smothers, 23 P.3d at 344 ("By the end of 1776, several of the
colonies-now states-had adopted constitutions and had prefaced them with
declarations or biBs of rights that stated 'in dogmatic fonn all of the seminal
principles of the English constitutional system. "') (quoting C. ELLIS STEVENS,
SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 34, 38 n.1 (1894».
Koch, supra note 51, at 365-66.
ld. at 367.
See Smothers, 23 P.3d at 344 (citing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 145 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980».
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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first adopted, and which were incorporated in that provision
by virtue of being established by law as rights the breach of
which precipitates a recognized injury. . .. The legislature
is precluded, therefore, from abolishing or substantially
modifying any such right unless it enacts a reasonable
alternative to the enforcement of that right. 87
III. TWO COMPONENTS OF OPEN COURTS: THE RIGHT TO
REMEDY, AND THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Courts have read two components in state open courts provisions: a
"right to remedy" component, guaranteeing a remedy in law for every
wrong or harm; and an "access to justice" component, guaranteeing
open, free, full, and speedy access to the courts. This section looks at
these two components in tum.
A.

The Right to Remedy

Cases under the right-to-remedy component fall into two
categories: those cases involving a complete abolition of a cause of
action; and those cases involving a partial abolition, or even a
restructuring, of a cause of action.
In the former category, some courts look to the history of the open
courts provision, including its roots in Magna Carta, to hold that the
legislature may not completely abolish a cause of action that existed
at the time of the state's adoption of its open courts provision, unless
the legislature also created a reasonable alternative. 88 Using this
historical approach, courts seem to privilege the state of the law at the
time of the adoption of the open courts ~rovision over government
interests in wholly abolishing the remedy. 9
In contrast to the historical approach, courts in the latter category
seem to apply a means-ends analysis-rational basis, or "middle tier"
review-to determine whether the restriction on available remedies is
87.

88.
89.

Binette v. Sabo, 7\0 A.2d 688,691 (Conn. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted).
See also Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 77 N.W. 174, 175 (Wis. 1898)
("[T]he right thus obtained as a concession from sovereign power has come down to
us through the centuries that have passed, and been preserved in all its integrity in
substantially all state constitutions. They do not grant the right, but guaranty the
preservation of one that existed under the constitution of England."); Smothers, 23
P.3d at 352 ("Consistent with the foregoing observations, this court for many years
held that the purpose of the remedy clause 'is to save from legislative abolishment
those jural rights which had become well established prior to the enactment of our
Constitution. "') (quoting Stewart v. Houk, 271 P. 998, 999 (Or. 1928».
See Binette, 710 A.2d at 691.
See id.
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sufficiently related to the legitimate purpose of the legislature. 9o
Using this means-ends approach, courts seem to privilege the
interests of the legislature (which is sometimes even unstated) in
enacting the restriction on the remedy.91
There appears to be no necessary correlation between one approach
or the other and success for the challenger. As argued below,
however, the historical approach probably offers stronger support to
Civil Gideon.
1.

Complete Abolition of Right

Courts in several states have adopted a principle that the legislature
may not abolish common law rights that existed at the time of the
adoption of the state's open courts provision without providing a
reasonable alternative. 92 Courts applying this principle look to the
state of the common law at the time of the adoption of their open
courts provisions to determine whether the right existed. 93 For
example, the Supreme Court of Oregon overturned the exclusive
remedy provision in the state's workers' compensation law, because
that provision abolished the historical common law negligence cause
of action that was available to workers prior to the workers'
compensation system. 94 The law left injured workers without a
remedy, unless they could show that their work was a major cause of
their injuries. 95
In analyzing the question, the court looked to the common law at
the time that Oregon adopted its open courts provision. 96 It
determined that a negligence cause of action-and, more particularly,
a negligence cause of action by an employee against an employer for
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.

95.
96.

Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212, 1214 (N.H. 1999).
See id. at 1214-15.
See Gentile v. Altennatt, 363 A.2d 1,22 (Conn. 1975) (holding courts must provide
alternate remedies if abolishing rights and remedies); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1,
4 (Fla. 1973) (holding the legislature may not abolish a statutory or common law
right without providing a reasonable alternative); Smothers, 23 P.3d at 362 (holding
an Oregon statute unconstitutional because it left no remedy for one which existed at
common law); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983) (holding a Texas
statute unconstitutional for abolishing a common law remedy without providing a
reasonable alternative).
See, e.g., Smothers, 23 P.3d at 360.
/d. at 362. See also Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 290 N.W.2d 276, 284 (Wis.
1980) (upholding a workers' compensation statute that operated to prevent a thirdparty tortfeasor from suing the employer for contribution, because "the denial of [the
third-party's] claim was confonnable to the law, for under the well established law of
Wisconsin no right of contribution against the employer exists").
Smothers, 23 P.3d at 357.
/d.
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failing to maintain a safe workplace-existed at the time of the
adoption of the open courts provision. 97 Therefore, the workers'
compensation system's abolition of this right ran afoul of the open
courts provision.
At least one court recognizing this principle has ruled that it does
not necessarily operate to establish a cause of action to protect rights
that may have existed at common law at the time the state enacted its
open courts provision. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Binette
v. Sabo,98 declined to recognize a private right of action against state
officers for constitutional torts under its open courts clause (although
it did establish the right of action under other provisions in its
constitution).99 The court reasoned:
[T]he doctrine that, [under the open courts provision], the
legislature may not diminish pre-I818 common-law or
statutory rights without enacting reasonable alternatives[]
does not necessarily imply, as the plaintiffs and amicus
assume, that [the open courts provision], embodies a private
cause of action for pre-I8I8 "fundamental" common-law
rights. 100
2.

Partial Abolition of Right

In contrast to the principle applied when the law wholly abolishes a
cause of action that existed at the time of the adoption of the open
courts provision, courts seem to apply some form of means-ends test
when lerislation merely limits recovery or changes the nature of the
claim. 10 For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld
a damage cap that limited a tort plaintiff s recovery against a
governmental unit to $50,000. 102 The court applied a very deferential
rational basis test,103 not even bothering to speculate as to the
legislative purpose.
The same court overturned a wrongful death damage cap that
limited the amount of damages where the death was caused by the
injury of which the plaintiff complained, but did not limit damages
where the death was caused by unrelated factors. 104 The court
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.

!d. at 358-59.
710 A.2d 688 (1998).
[d. at 692-93.
!d. at 692 (citations omitted).
See infra notes 102-09.
Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704, 709 (N.H. 1979).
[d. at 707.
Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212,1217 (N.H. 1999).
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applied "middle tier" review to determine whether the dama~e cap
had a "fair and substantial" relation to the purpose of the cap. I The
court was "unable to discern the legislature's intent in imposing a
cap" and therefore ruled the cap unconstitutional. 106
Finally, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a law that established
procedures for claims that public schools and the state failed to meet
their obligations under the "Education Article" of the Idaho
Constitution. 107 The law limited claims to specified persons and
required plaintiffs to exhaust certain other claims before suing the
state. 108 The court applied a very deferential standard of review,
focusing on the reasonableness of the scheme and on the alternative
means to a remedy that the scheme preserved. 109
B.

Access to Justice

Cases involving the access to justice component of open courts
provisions seem to rely on some form of means-ends analysis. In
those cases involving fee barriers to access, courts seem quite
deferential to the legislature, and they seem to privilege legislative
interests in recouping court costs and judicial efficiency. Similarly,
in those cases involving judicial restraints on access, courts seem to
privilege interests in judicial efficiency.
In contrast, cases examining attorney's fee provisions as an
impediment to access fall along a continuum. In those cases
involving post-litigation claims for attorney's fees, courts often reject
the open courts claim. This is hardly surprising, given that postlitigation the parties clearly enjoyed at least some minimal access
(i.e., they were at least present in the courtroom). In those cases
involving pre-litigation attorney's fees, courts seem much more likely
to fmd an open courts violation. In these cases, the courts seem to
privilege access over any interests of the legislature or adverse
parties. In those cases involving asymmetrical attorney's feeswhere one party, but not the other, is entitled to attorney's feescourts seem especially concerned with equal access.
As argued below, it is this third category of attorney's fee cases
that may provide the best fodder for Civil Gideon, although all the
access cases provide at least some support.

105.
106.

[d. at 1214.
[d. at 1217.

107.

Osmunson v. State, 17 P.3d 236 (Idaho 2000).

108.
109.

[d. at 238.
[d. at 239-40.
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Fee Barriers

In cases involving fee barriers to access, courts have applied some
form of rational basis review (or moderately heightened rational basis
review), upheld fees and restrictions that are reasonably tailored to
serve the efficient administration of the judiciary, and overturned
those that are not so tailored. Courts have thus upheld fees and
restrictions that are tailored to off-set court costs or otherwise
promote the efficiency of the jUdiciary; 110 on the other hand, courts
have overturned restrictions or fees that sweep more broadly than
necessary to promote the interest in judicial economy. III
The Illinois courts have perhaps most thoughtfully explored these
principles in a line of cases dealing with court fees under that state's
open courts provision. In Ali v. Danaher,112 for instance, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld a $1 litigation fee for the maintenance and
operation of the county law library, even though the challengers did
not use the library. 113 The court ruled that the library facilities were
"available to him and his attorney and anticipating their use is not
unreasonable." 114 Moreover, "it is clear that the presence of such
facilities is conducive to a proper and even improved administration
ojjustice which benefits every litigant." 115 In contrast, in Crocker v.
Finley, II 6 the same court struck down a $5 tax imposed on litigants in
a marriage dissolution case to be used to fund a domestic violence
shelter program. I 17 The court ruled that the purpose of the tax (to
fund the shelter) was too remotely related either to the marriage
dissolution or to an efficient judiciary. I 18
The Illinois lower courts applied these principles in a line of cases
that further illustrated and explained them. The court in Lee v.
Pucinski l19 upheld photocopying fees, where the fees served only to
off-set court costs, not for purposes unrelated to the efficient
operation of the jUdiciary: the reproduction fees "satisfy the
requirements of free access to justice because they are imposed only
for purposes relating to the service provided, not for the purpose of
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See itifra notes 112-30.
See id.
265 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. 1970).
/d. at 107.
[d. at 106.
[d. (emphasis added).
459 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1984).
/d. at 1351.
[d.
642 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

40

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 37

. . generaI revenue. ,,120 The court'm Zamarron v. P ucms
. ki· 121
raIsmg
upheld civil filing fees and a filing surcharge for automation of the
criminal and quasi-criminal COurtS,122 because they promoted the
"overall administration of justice.,,123 The court in Mellon v.
CojJelt l24 upheld a surcharge on all litigants to fund court-annexed
mandatory arbitration in the overall interest of an efficient judiciary,
even thoufoh the challengers did not use the court-annexed arbitration
system. 12 The court ruled that "the existence and proper functioning
of the [arbitration] System may benefit the overall administration of
justice." 126
Other courts have relied upon the interest to recoup court costs or
to promote judicial efficiency l27 to uphold a fee for the clerk's record
charged to a~J'ellant in a criminal case,128 a filing fee in an inmate's
civil action,1 and a jury fee in a civil action, even where the plaintiff
had an independent state constitutional right to a jury trial, and where
the fee was non-refundable if the plaintiff elected to forego that
right. 130
120.

121.
122.
123.

124.
125.
126.

127.

128.

129.
130.

Id. at 773.
668 N.E.2d 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
Id. at 192.
/d. at 191.
730 N.E.2d 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
Id. at 108.
Id. at 111.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon this distinction in upholding a probate
court fee (which the court called a "tax") against an equal protection challenge.
Treiber v. Knoll, 398 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Wis. 1987) ("[The probate fee] seeks to
make the probate system substantially self-sustaining and paid for by those who use
it rather than by total funding from general tax revenues drawn from the public at
large."). The court relied instead on the history of its open courts provision in
upholding the fee under an open courts challenge. /d. The court thus ruled that the
fee here was not "a species of official exactions made as the price of delaying or
expediting justice" that the open courts provision was designed to prohibit. /d. As
described above, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning in this case-using the
historical purpose of its open courts provision, not the overarching concern for offsetting court costs and efficiency within the judiciary-appears to be somewhat
anomalous in the context of fee barrier cases.
State v. Harrold, 750 P.2d 959, 965-66 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) ("The constitutional
prohibition against 'sale' of justice is not implicated by the collection of a reasonable
fee from a person who is able to pay."). Key to the court's decision here was that the
appellant never claimed she was indigent or unable to pay the fee. Such a claim
would have authorized the lower court to waive the fee under state law. /d. at 965.
Longval v. Superior Court Dep't of Trial Court, 752 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 2001).
Barzellone v. Presley, 126 P.3d 588,592 (Okla. 2005) ("By 1932, it was recognized
that the right to reasonable court fees was so generally accepted that its discussion
seemed unnecessary. Rather, the imposition of such fees was determined not to be a
denial or sale of justice within the meaning of [the open courts provision] provided
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Judicial Restrictions on Access to the Courts

Courts have privileged this same interest in judicial efficiency
when considering judicial restrictions on access to the courts. Thus,
for example, the Colorado Supreme Court enjoined a litigant from
proceeding pro se as a plaintiff in the state courts, where the litigant
had initiated numerous meritless civil lawsuits in the state without the
assistance of counsel. 131 The court indicated that the litigant's
numerous suits unnecessarily burdened the taxpayers who pay for the
costs of court administration. 132 In addition, other judges had to be
transferred into the county to hear the litigant's suits against the
district judge. 133 The court noted that this was "not only a waste of
money and judicial time, but [that it] also interfere[d] with the
dockets in the jurisdiction from which the transferred judges must
come.,,134 The litigant's proliferation of meritless suits not only
inhibited judicial efficiency, but also interfered with the rights of
other litigants by crowdin~ the courts with suits stemming from the
complaints of one person. I 5 "In a proper case, then, the right of free
access to our courts must rield to the rights of others and the efficient
administration of justice." 36
But the court also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to impose similar
restrictions on litigation in the federal courts, because the petitioner's
abusive suits had been limited only to the state courtS.137 This
holding illustrates that the means-ends test in these cases is
important: the interest in judicial efficiency may yield to the litigant's
interest in access when the restriction attempts to proscribe behavior
that has not interfered with an efficient judiciary.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

they were unifonn, reasonable and related to the services provided. The language of
the constitutional provision was deemed to mean simply that justice coulU not be
bought, nor that litigation expenses, in the nature of costs and disbursement, be so
exorbitant and onerous as to virtually close the courthouse door.") (citations omitted).
But see Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 873 (Okla. 2006) (overturning a
statutory requirement that would-be medical malpractice claimants file an "affidavit
of merit" prior to initiating suit, because the requirement "closes the court house
doors to those financially incapable of obtaining" the affidavit and was not because
of the court's interest in judicial efficiency).
People v. Spencer, 524 P.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Colo. 1974).
ld. at 1086.
ld.

ld.
ld.
ld.
!d.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court more recently upheld litigation
restrictions imposed by a lower court on an abusive litigant using the
same reasoning. 138 Considering the interest in judicial efficiency
against the claimant's open courts challenge, the court wrote:
Our state courts and appellate system do not possess
unlimited resources, and therefore, [the claimant's] petitions
and appeals consume valuable time and money. Clearly,
[the claimant's] actions restrict access to other persons who
may have nonfrivolous cases and who do not seek to flood
the courts with nonmeritorious actions. Thus, the district
court was justified in limitin~ the number of pleadings
which [the claimant] could file. 9
Even when courts overturn judicially-imposed litigation
restrictions, the efficient operation of the court system counterbalances the claimant's rights under the open courts provision. 140
But in these cases, the restrictions were not sufficiently tailored to
serve that interest. Thus, the court in Mathena v. Haines 141
overturned a lower court order that enjoined an inmate from filing
any motions, letters, or communications to the lower court, unless the
documents were signed by an attorney, because the order was not
"designed to preserve [the inmate's] right to adequate, effective, and
meaningful access, while protecting the court from abuse.,,142 The
court held that litigation restrictions would survive an open courts
challenge, if they were based on a judicial finding of the inmate's
"clear intent[] to obstruct the administration of justice," and if they
were "designed to preserve his ri¥ht to adequate, effective, and
meaningful access to [the] courtS.,,14

138.
139.

140.
141.
142.
i43.

State ex rei. Tyler v. Douglas County Dist. Court, 580 N.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Neb.
1998).
[d. at 99.
[d.

633 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 2006).
[d. at 776 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (l977».
[d. at 778; see also Vest v. Vest, No. 2040332, 2006 WL 3457614, at *1, *3-4 (Ala.
Civ. App. Dec. 1,2006) (overturning a lower court's order limiting a litigant's ability
to seek post-judgment relief to a period of 45 days following the entry to judgment,
because it was not tailored to achieve the court's objective "to resolve all such
disputes expeditiously" while preserving the litigant's meaningful access to the
courts); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass'n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1345 (lOth Cir. 2006)
(upholding filing restrictions on a litigant within the federal circuit where the litigant
filed frivolous lawsuits, but overturning filing restrictions in other federal circuits,
based on the interest in "restrict[ing] further abusive filings" by the litigant).
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Attorney's Fees as a Restriction on Access

There are three categories of cases which deal with open courts
challenges to attorney's fees. Those cases considering challenges to
post-litigation claims for attorney's fees seem to defer to legislative
judgments about which liti,aants ought to be entitled to attorney's fees
Those cases considering challenges to
in what kinds of claims. I
pre-litigation claims for attorney's fees move toward recognition that
attorney's fees-even if opposing party's attorney's fees-represent
a real and meaningful barrier to litigation for those who cannot
pay. 145 Finally, those cases considering challenges to asymmetrical
fee-shifting statutes (which authorize attorney's fees for one party in
an action, but not to the other under similar circumstances) privilege
an interest in equal access. 146
a.

Post-litigation claims Jar attorney's Jees

Courts have granted great deference to legislation conferring,
limiting, or otherwise defining the scope of attorney's fee awards
against challenges under state open courts provisions, when the
challenge succeeds the underlying litigation. 14 Courts have upheld
statutes granting attorney's fees, imposing caps on attorney's fees,
and otherwise limiting claims for attorney's fees usually under some
form of rational basis review, post-judgment.1 4s This makes some
sense: where a litigant has actually gained access to the courts, that
litigant is hard-pressed to argue that he or she was denied access to
the courts because of a post-hoc attorney fee award (one way or the
other). In these cases, statutes providing for attorney's fees or
appointment of counsel need only allow a litigant reasonable access
to the courts (and not foreclose access altogether) in order to comport
with open courts provisions. 149 In other words, courts will uphold a
fee-shifting statute or a legislative restriction on attorney's fees as
long as it allows some opportunity or alternative for the litigants to
gain some access-even if not the litigant's preferred access-to the
courts. 150 This standard is never hard to meet after the underlying

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See infra
See infra
See infra
See infra

ld.
ld.
ld.

Part III.B.3.a.
Part IlLB.3.b.
Part III.B.3.c.
notes 152-84 and accompanying text.
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litigation, because then it is a truism that all parties had at least some
access to the court. 151
F or example, the Supreme Court of Florida in a pair of typical feeshifting cases, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe l52 and
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Nichols,153 upheld feeshifting statutes against attack under the state's open courts provision
after the underlying litigation came to an end. 154 In Florida
Patient's, the court equated attorney's fees with other costs of
litigation commonly assessed against the losing party and thus upheld
a statute granting attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a medical
malpractice claim. 155 Similarly, the court in State Farm upheld an
"offer of judgment" statute that granted attorney's fees to an insurer,
where the insurer filed an offer or judgment that was not accepted' by
the plaintiff within thirtY days in a suit for benefits under a personal
insurance agreement. 156 In both cases, of course, the challenger had
literal access to the courts, as evidenced by the actual litigation: in
Florida Patient's, the challenger went to court and lost the case; 157
and in State Farm, the challenger went to court and won. 158 In the
former, the challenger simply had to pay the prevailing party's
attorney's fees; 159 in the latter, the challenger received attorney's fees
less than the parties agreed upon. 160 The Florida court thus gave
these challenges scant analysis, deferring to the legislation in both
cases,161 and was quite clear in its position on attorney's fees and
open courts: "fee-shifting statutes generally do not deny access to the
courts." 162
Courts have similarly upheld statutory caps on attorney's fees
against open courts challenges after the underlying litigation ceased.
For example, the court in Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
932 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2006).
Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1149; State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1077.
Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1149; see also Capellen v. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d
539, 546 (Tex. App. 1994) ("[T]he award of reasonable attorney's fees is no more a
limitation on a party's right to seek redress ... than is the high cost of litigation and
the danger of being assessed costs, attorney's fees and damages, including punitive
damages, an unconstitutional limitation on a party's right to seek relief or to defend
in a suit involving a common law cause of action.").
932 So. 2d at 1076.
Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1145.
932 So. 2d at 1067.
Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1145.
State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1067.
Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1148; State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1075-76.
State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1077.
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Beach 163 upheld and enforced a statutory cap on attorney's fees that a
successful workers' compensation claimant could receive from his
employer, because the cap bore "a reasonable relationship to the
state's interest in regulating fees so as to preserve the benefits
awarded to the claimant.,,164 The court ruled that the claimant failed
to show that the cap "abolished or unduly burdened [his] right to
obtain benefits" 165 and that the cap therefore did not deny his access
to the courts. 166 The court thus applied something like rational basis
review, merely requiring that the cap bear a "reasonable relationship
to the state's interest" and demanding that the claimant show that the
cap wholly abolished or "unduly burdened" his access. 167 Indeed,
these were high standards, for a claimant who had already won his
case and underscored the claimant's burden to show something more
than a partial denial of access to the courts in order to succeed on an
open courts challenge to an attorney's fees statute. 168
Other courts have upheld restrictions on attorney's fees (and even
on representation) using a similarly deferential approach after the
underlying litigation ended. Thus, the court in Quackenbush v.
Superior Court l69 upheld a voter proposition that limited noneconomic damages resulting from certain automobile accidents. 170
Plaintiffs claimed that the proposition impaired their access to the
courts, because attorney's contingency fees normally came from non171
.
economic damages, not compensatory damages.
The court
rejected that argument, ruling that affected plaintiffs will be able to
obtain counsel and thus achieve access by arrangements other than
•
C
. damages. 172
contmgent
lee agreements base d on non-economIc
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Hartley v.
Hartle/ 73 upheld a statute allowing a court to appoint counsel to a
dependent child in a custody dispute, but rejected the child's claim
that Colorado's open courts provision entitled him to counsel of his
choice after the court awarded custody to his father. 174 The court
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

932 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
ld. at 510.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 509-10.
70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271 (Ct. App. 1997).
ld. at 273.
ld. at 279.
ld.
886 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1994).
ld. at 675.
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ruled that the open courts provision did not create a substantive right;
instead, it "guarantee [d] access to the courts when an individual ha[ d]
a viable claim for relief." 175 Because the child claimed a substantive
right-the right to counsel of his choice-the open courts provision
· no h eIp. 176
gave h 1m
Thus any access, even if not the claimant's preferred access,
satisfies the open courts provision. l77 And when considered after the
underlying litigation, it is hardly surprising that courts find that
claimants actually had some access (of course they did)-and uphold
a fees statute against open courts challenges.
One case deserves special mention because of the strong
underlying interest at stake. Doe v. State l78 involved a class-action
challenge to Connecticut's restrictions on p~ents for abortions for
Although the class of
patients receiving state medical assistance. I
indigent women prevailed on the merits, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut denied their claim for attorney's fees under the state's
open courts provision. 180 The court ruled that it was the plaintiffs'
indigency, not their successful constitutional challenge against the
state funding restriction, that gave rise to their claim for attorney's
fees. 181 But the court had "never recognized a rule that indigency
alone require [d] the state to waive the fees and costs, and bear the
entire financial burden of litigation itself." 182 Moreover, "it [was]
clear that, in this instance, [the Connecticut courts] were 'open,' and
that the plaintiffs had 'access' to them.,,183 Of course the class did:
they retained counsel, put on their case, and won.
Thus, even when the underlying claim rises to constitutional
dimensions, courts seem to honor the trend that costly, inconvenient,
or disagreeable access is nevertheless constitutionally sufficient
access under open courts provisions. Only those fee statutes that

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

182.
183.

!d.
!d. at 675-76.
ld.
579 A.2d 37 (Conn. 1990).
ld. at 38-39.
ld. at 45.
ld. ("Rather, it is the plaintiffs' indigency which becomes the keystone of their
argument. . .. Their current claim is that, as prevailing indigents, they are entitled to
attorneys' fees, not that the constitutional violation from which they suffered a
cognizable injury has not been redressed.").
ld. at 44.
ld.; see also Kiddie v. Kiddie, 563 P.2d 139, 142 (Okla. 1977) (ruling that a husband
had no right to appointed counsel in a divorce proceeding and that his lack of funds
to employ counsel "technically [did] not deny [him] access to the courts").
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access-will violate open courts provisions. 184
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47

absolute denial of

Pre-litigation attorney's fees

When attorney's fees serve to bar access absolutely, courts have
found a violation of the open courts provision with little analysis.
For example, the courts in Communiw, Hospital of the Palm Beaches,
Inc. v. Guerrero l85 and In re Flores 86 both found a violation of the
open courts provisions when litigants were ordered to pay the
opposing party's attorney's fees up front, prior to the litigation. In
Community Hospital, the court overturned a provision that required
healthcare professionals, when contesting discipline or lost
privileges, to post security in the amount of opposing parties'
potential attorney's fees prior to initiating suit. 187 In Flores, the court
ruled that any court order to strike a trial, on the basis that the
opposing party failed to pay interim attorney's fees, was
unconstitutional. 188 In each case, attorney's fees provisions cut off
access before the underlying trial began. In both instances, the courts
did not hesitate to find an open courts violation.
c.

Asymmetrical attorney's fees

In certain civil actions, courts have been more concerned with
equality of access to the judiciary when considering fee-shifting
statutes that permit attorney's fees for one party but not the other.
ThIs type of fee-shifting statute is often designed to equalize access
between parties in cases where one party is at some sort of an
inherent disadvantage, or to encourage litigants to bring certain
socially desirable claims that they might not otherwise bring for fear
of incurring insurmountable litigation costs. Courts in these cases
often subject these statutes to a higher level of scrutiny because they
treat parties differently for attorney's fee purposes and consider the
statutes' role in equalizing access between otherwise unequal
litigants, thus taking seriously the imperative of equal access to
justice. The courts consider the relative abilities of the parties to
secure access in the underlying litigation, the purpose of the feeshifting provision in equalizing access between the parties, and the
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
579 So. 2d 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
135 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. App. 2004).
579 So. 2d at 305 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (citing Guerrero v. Humana, Inc., 548 So.
2d 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989».
Flores, 135 S.W.3d at 865.
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nature of the underlying case. These factors often trump any
concerns about disparate treatment between the parties on the face of
an asymmetrical fee-shifting statute.
An Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum
CO.,189 provides an excellent example of these principles. In Thayer,
the court upheld a fee-shifting statute that authorized attorney's fees
for a prevailing plaintiff, but not for the defendant when he removed
a case from small claims court to district court. 190 The court
reaffirmed that "equal access to the courts, and modes of procedure
therein, constitute basic and fundamental rights,,,191 and that "[w]here
fundamental rights and liberties are involved, classifications which
might restrain them must be strictly scrutinized." 192
Notwithstanding its strict scrutiny analysis, the court nevertheless
upheld the asymmetrical fee-shifting provision based on broader
considerations of equal access to justice. 193 The court's reasoning is
worth quoting at length:
The obvious intent of the statute imposing attorney fees on
the defendant if the plaintiff prevails is to preserve the
viability and accessibility of the small claims court. The
exegesis behind the small claims court is to open the courts
to the citizenry. . .. The small claims court provides redress
for the ordinary person.
The plaintiff who attempts to recover a nominal sum in
district court is likely to be intimidated by the judicial
process, and the employment of counsel becomes a
necessity rather than an option. The litigants are treated
equally so long as the case remains within the ambit of the
small claims court. It is only when the defendant elects to
transfer the case that attorney fees are impressed on the
defendant, should he lose.
. . . The statute is obviously imposed as an incentive to
prompt settlement of small but well-founded claims, to
foster the legislative policy of summary, informal

189.

613 P.2d 1041 (Okla. 1980).

190.
191.
192.
193.

Jd.atI045.
Jd. at 1044.
Jd. at 1045.
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disposition of small claims, and as a deterrent to groundless
defenses. 194
Thus the court's two broader concerns-equalizing access between
otherwise unequal litigants (by providing the one, but not the other,
with counsel), and affecting the purposes of the small claims court (to
"open the courts to the citizenry")-justified the asymmetrical feeshifting fgf0vision, despite its facially disparate treatment of the
litigants. 95
Similarly, in Alford v. Garzone l96 the court upheld a fee-~hifting
statute that authorized attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs securing
protective orders under Oklahoma's Protection from Domestic Abuse
Act, but not to defendants who were successful in avoiding protective
The court ruled that ready access to courts is a
orders. 197
fundamental right irrespective of the underlying claim, thus
triggering strict scrutiny. 198 But when the court applied strict
scrutiny to the fee-shifting provision, it nevertheless upheld it in the
broader interest of equalizing access between parties in very different
situations and encouraging victims of domestic violence to bring
claims. 199 The court reasoned: "[the fee-shifting statute] is rationally
based and concerns a compelling state interest. It encourages victims
to pursue their legal remedies in court without the threat of attorney
fees being awarded should an order not be entered.,,2oo
Other courts have upheld asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes using
similar reasoning. The court in Westfield Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities

194.
195.

199.

ld. at 1043 (footnote omitted).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed the spirit of this ruling in Professional
Credit Collections, Inc. v. Smith, 933 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1997). In that case, the court
overturned a lower court's denial of attorney's fees to a dismissed defendant in a
collection action by a creditor. ld. at 309. The lower court denied fees based on a
statute that authorized fees only for "prevailing" parties. Ed. at 309, 310 n.l. The
court ruled that the defendant was a prevailing party for the purpose of the feeshifting statute, and that the open courts provision demanded that the dismissed
defendant qualifY for attorney's fees where the plaintiff creditor, if successful, would
have qualified for attorney's fees under the fee-shifting statute. ld. at 311.
964 P.2d 944 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
Ed. at 948.
ld. at 947 (citing Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 613 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Okla.
1980)). In Thayer, the court found "that equal access to the courts ... constitute[ s]
basic and fundamental rights" and that "[w]here fundamental rights and liberties are
involved, classifications which might restrain them must be strictly scrutinized." 613
P.2d at 1044-45.
Alford, 964 P.2d at 948.

200.
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upheld, under rational basis review, a provision that
authorized attornez6"s fees for a franchisee, but not a franchisor, in a
franchise dispute. 02 The court ruled that the statute was a legitimate
attempt to equalize access between parties with unequal resources,
stating, "The Legislature may well have detennined that the
comparable economic positions of the parties were such that free
access to the courts for the franchisee could only be £Uaranteed if
counsel fees could be awarded to successful plaintiffs.,,2
The Vennont Supreme Court in Fleury v. Kessel/Duff Construction
CO. 204 upheld a statute authorizing attorney's fees to a prevailing
empl0ifsee, but not a prevailing employer, in a workers' compensation
case. 2 5 The court's analysis was admittedly sparse, but it was
clearly based on its concern for ensuring equal access as between
litigants with unequal resources. It stated, "Indeed, we have come to
recognize as a society that a denial of the right to recover attorney's
fees, or alternatively, publicly subsidized counsel, will prevent many
individuals including workers' compensation claimants from having
. . ,,20()
access to Justice.
And finally, the court in Bay/ront Medical Center, Inc. v. Li07
upheld, under rational basis review, a statute that required
unsuccessful, non-indigent plaintiffs-but not unsuccessful, indigent
plaintiffs-to pay the attorney's fees of the prevailing defendant. 208
The court reasoned that "[t]he legislature has the power to exempt
indigent litigants from the ambit of the statute. Such an exemption
does not affect a solvent litigant's right of access to the court but
rather, protects an indigent party's right of access to the courts." 109
Thus in considering asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes, courts seem
to privilege the broader interest of equal access as between litigants
who are otherwise unequal (because of resources, or because of their
relative role in the claim) over the facial disparate treatment under the
statute, whatever level of scrutiny the courts apply. In other words,
courts' overriding consideration in these cases is equal access to
justice for all parties, not just the party claiming that an asymmetrical
fee-shifting statute impedes its access to the courts. And courts

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

392 A.2d 243 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 1978).
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
543 A.2d 703 (Vt. 1988).
Id. at 703, 705.
Id.
465 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1384 (emphasis added).
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therefore interpret the open courts provision to ensure that
asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes provide equal access to all,
notwithstanding the fact that these statutes by their nature yield a
facially disparate result.
IV. OPEN COURTS AND CIVIL GIDEON
Based on this analysis of selected open courts cases, the open
courts case for Civil Gideon may be best made by combining an
historical argument (drawing on those cases analyzing a complete
abolition of a right of action, discussed supra)210 with an equal access
argument (drawing on the attorney's fees cases, discussed supra).2l1
An argument based on judicial efficiency (based on the fee-access
and judicial restraint cases, discussed supra)212 may offer some
additional support, but the low-tier means-ends test (in those cases
considering a partial restraint on a cause of action, and in some other
cases) offers nothing positive toward Civil Gideon.
This section provides some thoughts on each of these arguments,
save the last, in their likely order of usefulness in establishing Civil
Gideon. Because the historical argument, the equal access argument,
and the judicial efficiency argument are rooted in very different
approaches to open courts provisions, their combination offers
perhaps the most comprehensive approach under open courts to
achieve Civil Gideon.
A.

The Historical Argument

As described more fully above, the historical analysis looks to
rights of action that existed at the time of the adoption of the open
courts provision to determine whether a statutory restraint violates
the open courts provision. If the rights existed at the time of
adoption, a complete denial, without a meaningful alternative, is
likel y to be overturned. 2 \3
Civil Gideon existed in the statutory and common law as early as
1494, well before any state enacted an open courts provision. 214 The
210.
211.
212.
213.

214.

See supra Part lILA.
See supra Part III.B.I.
See supra Part III.B.2.
Attorneys for appellant Deborah Frase (including Stephen H. Sachs and Debra
Gardner, both of whom participated in this Symposium) presented substantially this
same argument to the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md.
100,840 A.2d 114 (2003). See Brief of Appellant at 32-36, Frase, 379 Md. 100,840
A.2d 114 (No.6).
ld. at 32-36; see infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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English Parliament, in order to "carry the poor man through the ins
and outs of an action at common law,,,215 enacted 11 Hen. VII, ch.
12, which read in part:
[T]he Justices [] shall assigne to the same pou psone or
psones Councell lerned by their discrecions which shall
geve their Councelles nothing taking for the same, and in
like wise the same Justices shall appoynte attorney and
attorneies for the same pou psone and psones and all other
officers requisite and necessarie to be hadde for the spede of
the seid sutes to be hadde and made which shall doo their
duties without any rewardes for their Counce lIes help and
besynes in the same .... 216
The English courts extended this right to counsel to civil defendants
as a matter of common law in 1668 in Wait v. Farthing. 217 Thus, the
right to court-appointed counsel for indigent civil plaintiffs and
defendants had deep historical roots by the time the first states
adopted open courts provisions. According to an historical analysis,
state open courts provisions adopted when English statutory and
common law reco~nized a right to appointed counsel also sought to
protect this right. 2
215.
216.

217.
218.

John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REv. 361, 373
(1923).
II HEN. 7, ch. 12 (1495), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 (1816),
microformed on Microcard No. 55E53 (Matthew Bender & Co.). See also Maguire,
supra note 215, at 373-74 (quoting the Henry VII statute and commenting that "[i]f
the rules of law be complicated, [the poor] are to have the aid of lawyers
gratuitously"). This statute remained on the books until 1883. A rule sometime prior
to 1744, however, probably somewhat circumscribed the practical application of this
right to counsel. This rule required that a person seeking in forma pauperis status
(and thus appointed counsel) should "have a Counsel's Hand to his Petition." /d. at
377 (quoting LILLY'S REG., ed. 1745,851, tit. Forma Pauperis). Maguire notes that
the "rule itself is one of the best imaginable illustrations to a vicious circle. An
applicant comes to court for gratuitous legal service because he cannot beg or pay for
a lawyer's services; he finds that he must beg or pay for a lawyer's certificate before
the court will hear him; and so his suit ends without ever beginning." Id. When the
statute was revoked in 1883, new court rules "liberalized the practice in important
respects," but left the requirement "of an opinion from counsel and affidavit from a
solicitor" to "get these vital documents." Id. at 380.
84 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1668).
This argument may receive additional support under those state constitutions that
contain an incorporation clause explicitly providing the benefits of English statutes
on a particular date to the citizens of the state. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, supra
note 213, at 32-33. Maryland's incorporation clause reads as follows:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common
Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of
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It is not clear that courts would apply an historical analysis to a
claim for Civil Gideon, however. Courts seem to have applied an
historical analysis in those cases involving a statutory deprivation of
a cause of action, not an assertion of particular affirmative procedural
or substantive rights. 219 But there appears to be no good reason not
to apply an historical analysis to a claim for Civil Gideon. At least,
the historical evidence would buttress arguments based on equal
access and judicial efficiency.
B.

The Equal Access Argument

This argument is based upon the privileged interest in equal access
to the courts under the attorney's fees cases. These cases are
particularly relevant to Civil Gideon, because attorney's fees and feeshifting statutes are closely related to the right to counsel.
Attorney's fees and fee-shifting statutes provide free or reducedcost legal representation to the party to whom the court grants
attorney's fees, usually the winning party.220 From the winning
party's financial perspective, this fee-shifting is the functional
equivalent to receiving appointed counsel 221 (The only difference is
that the opposing party, not the court, pays the costs of
representation. But this makes no difference to the winning party).222
Fee-shifting provisions thus yield the same result as a court
appointing counsel; but the triggering characteristic for many feeshifting provisions is not poverty or indigence, but rather victory in
that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as
existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventysix; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their
local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and
practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity . . . subject,
nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the
Legislature of this State.

219.
220.

221.

222.

MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. V.
See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.3.a. See, e.g., 42 V.S.c. § 1988(b) (2006) ("[T]he court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs."); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 49-262(D) (1956) ("The court ... may award costs of
litigation, including reasonable attorney ... fees, to any substantially prevailing party
. . . . "); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 6-213(C) (LEXISNEXIS 1999) ("[T]he
prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable
attorney's fees.").
See supra note 13 (noting that appointed counsel is at the public's expense and thus
free to indigent persons).
See supra Part III.B.3.a. (citing cases that state the opposing party pays the cost of
litigation); see supra note 220.
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the underlying suit. 223 Some fee-shifting statutes are designed to
encourage meritorious or socially desirable claims. 224 These statutes
authorize the award of attorney's fees to a victorious plaintiff in order
to encoura~e (or, rather, not to discourage) certain socially desirable
But these do not change the underlying similarity
litigation. 2
between fee-shifting statutes and court orders appointing counsel: the
successful party in either situation receives free legal counsel. Feeshifting statutes thus have much in common with courts appointing
counsel, especially from the vantage point of the litigant who
receives attorney's fees or court-appointed counsel.
Judicial deference to the legislature in the line of cases ruling on
awards of attorney's fees after the underlying litigation, discussed
more fully above, teach only that the courts respect the legislature's
judgment as to which cases and which litigants deserve a given level
of representation paid for by the opposing party. For Civil Gideon
purposes, these cases suggest that the courts would uphold a statute
awarding attorney's fees to a victorious indigent civil litigant, but
they certainly do not suggest that open courts (or any other
constitutional provision) would compel attorney's fees or
appointment of counsel.
The line of cases involving attorney's fees imposed prior to
litigation gets us a step closer to Civil Gideon. Courts in these cases
seem to recognize that attorney's fees pose a real barrier to the courts
for those who cannot afford them. To be sure, these cases involve
requirements to pay the other party's attorney's fees up front.
Nevertheless, courts in these cases have not hesitated to overturn the
requirement under an open courts challenge. The principle behind
these cases seems to be that attorney's fees-anyone's attorney's
fees--create a meaningful barrier to access. So too with indigent
civil litigants haled into court against their will or with indigent civil
litigants pressing a claim in order to protect their rights: their full
access to the jUdiciary-i.e., access with representation by counselis meaningfully impeded by their inability to pay their own attorney's
fees. 226

223.
224.

225.
226.

See supra Part III.B.3.a.
Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 190 (1984) (discussing the policy behind fee-shifting
statutes).
ld.
This is especially true in those cases involving basic human needs-not because the
personal interest is high, but because indigent litigants may have a harder time
fmding counsel to represent them on a contingent-fee basis.
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Combining these cases with the cases involving asymmetrical
attorney's fees provisions, we come yet closer to Civil Gideon. As
described more fully above, those cases add an interest in equality to
the interest in access, sometimes even heightening the level of
scrutiny. But under any level of scrutiny, courts in this line privilege
the interest in equality as between the litigants, especially otherwise
unequal litigants, so that each may obtain counsel. Thus, as
described more fully above, courts have upheld asymmetrical feeshifting provisions against open courts challenges based on the
broader interest of promoting equality in litigation as between parties
with unequal access to counsel. In other words, any access barriers in
asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes will yield to broader interests in
equality in litigation. The narrow holding in these cases is that
legislative efforts to equalize parties' access by authorizing attorney's
fees to one party, but not the other, withstand an open courts
challenge. But the principle behind these holdings is that meaningful
access to the courts requires counsel when the opposing party has
access to counsel. This principle, even if not the strict, narrow
holdings in these fee-shifting cases, puts us at the doorstep of Civil
Gideon.
C.

The Judicial Efficiency Argument

This argument builds on the interest behind those cases involving
fee barriers and judicial restraints on access to the courts. 227 As
described more fully above, courts in these cases seem to privilege
the interests in recouping costs of litigation and in overall judicial
efficiency. 228 The claim for Civil Gideon appeals strongly to the
latter.
Unrepresented litigants can often impede judicial efficiency in their
own cases and in the courts in general, because court personnel need
to expend additional time and resources to ensure that they receive as
fair an access as possible. The judges and clerks must take time to
help unrepresented litigants through a process that is often entirely
foreign to them: helping them to prepare court filings, to understand
court rules and other rules of procedure, and even to present their
case, all within the bounds of maintaining a neutral judiciary.
Depending on the case and the litigant, this can result in significant
time and effort on the part of court personnel, drawing judicial
resources away from other cases and impeding speed and efficiency
227.
228.

See supra Part III.B.I-2.
See supra Part m.B.I.
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in the unrepresented litigant's own case. Professor Engler writes that
other players within the court system in an attempt to foster change
have· developed creative practices to help those without
counsel achieve justice; these individuals are more in need
of the backing of court administrators, additional resources,
or even philosophical justifications to support their work.
Moreover, the process is dynamic, not static, as conferences,
trainings and reports have caused a detectable shift in
attitudes. Behavior [assisting unrepresented litigants] that
was impermissible a decade ago is becoming more
acceptable today .
. . . Unrepresented litigants are perceived to be a problem
because they take up court and attorney time. 229
Moreover, litigation with an unrepresented party may result in
additional errors that an attorney could easily have avoided.
Correcting these errors-especially if the correction requires an
appeal-draws on judicial resources that could be used in other cases.
Frase v. Barnhart,230 the 2003 Maryland Civil Gideon case,
provides an excellent example of misallocated judicial resources to
correct gross errors at trial that an attorney almost certainly would
have prevented. In that case, Ms. Frase involuntarily appeared pro se
to defend against a private petition for custody of her children. 23 1
The list of her litigation mistakes at a hearing before a special master
is (understandably) long; it includes some fundamental errors that
any litigating attorney (or even upper-level law student) would have
avoided. 232 The special master "addressed Ms. Frase reprovingly"
and cut her off in her questioning,233 behavior that skewed the factfinding at the hearing and that an attorney certainly would have
challenged. In addition, the special master had been retained by Ms.
Frase's mother-an adverse witness in the case-ten years earlier in
her own custody case against Ms. Frase, resulting in a likely violation
of a rule of judicial ethics. 234 A competent attorney certainly would
have discovered this earlier in the case and moved to remove the
master from the case. Finally, in a blatantly procedurally flawed
229.
230.
23 L
232.
233.
234.

Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social
Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 697, 705-06 (2006) (citations omitted).
379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003).
Brief of Appellant, supra note 213, at 29.
Id. at 29-32.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 14-19; see also Frase, 379 Md. at 126,840 A.2d at 129 (reversing the circuit
court's ruling and holding the issue was moot, thereby not addressing it).
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ruling,235 the circuit court entered untenable conditions on its award
of custody to Ms. Frase that were also substantively flawed on their
face. 236
In order to correct these problems-many of which a competent
attorney would have avoided in the first place-Ms. Frase's case
went all the way to Maryland's highest court, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. 237 The court, in a lengthy and divisive opinion reflecting
the significant and unnecessary judicial resources expended in this
case, reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded without
addressing Ms. Frase's claimed right to counsel. 238 Unfortunately,
Ms. Frase's case is not even the worst example of the many cases
involving misuse of judicial resources to correct problems that an
attorney would easily have avoided. 239
Thus, the cases dealing with fees and judicial restraints on
litigation, i.e., the cases that take seriously the interest in judicial
efficiency, lend support to Civil Gideon, because court-appointed
counsel for otherwise unrepresented individuals often enhances
judicial efficiency (or, stated differently, avoids gross inefficiencies).
The larger challenge to any of these three arguments-and the
challenge that litigants must be prepared to face-is that courts rarely
use open courts provisions to recognize or grant affirmative rights,
like the right to counsel. Rather, courts use open courts provisions
overwhelmingly to protect a negative right-the right against
interference by the state to the courts. As anyone who has
represented low-income individuals knows, this is a false dichotomy;
an indigent individual's poverty is every bit as much a barrier to the
235.

236.

237.
238.
239.

Frase, 379 Md. at 120, 840 A.2d at 125-26 ("[W]e note our disagreement with the
procedure employed by the court, of purporting to decide the custody case, on
exceptions from the master's report and recommendations, and yet setting conditions
inconsistent with the custody awarded and subjecting Ms. Frase to periodic review
hearings. The very thing that makes the order immediately appealable also erodes its
validity.").
Id. at 125, 840 A.2d at 129 ("Having found Ms. Frase to be a fit parent in her existing
circumstances and having found no exceptional circumstances that would make her
custody of Brett detrimental to his best interest, the court had no more authority to
direct where she and the child must live than it had to direct where the child must go
to school or what religious training, if any, he should have, or what time he must go
to bed.").
!d. at 100,840 A.2d at 114.
!d. at 128-29, 840 A.2d at 131.
!d. at 134, 840 A.2d at 134 ("The facts in the present custody related case are not
even as egregious as many we see. In many cases a poor, sometimes undereducated
and unsophisticated, parent is faced with the full might of the State, an entity that
itself seeks to deprive the parent of his or her children.") (Cathell, J., concurring).
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courts as a statutory or judicial restriction on access. Now we need to
persuade the courts of this truth.

v.

CONCLUSION

The jurisprudential disarray among state courts in interpreting their
open courts provisions makes any generalization about open courts
difficult. But despite often inconsistent and incoherent rulings among
the states, certain larger patterns seem to emerge from these cases and
lend support to Civil Gideon.
This article attempted to draw on some of those patterns to begin to
develop a more comprehensive open courts argument for Civil
Gideon. I hope that Civil Gideon instigators can build upon and
apply some of these patterns in the context of the open courts
jurisprudence of their own state courts and thus move in the direction
of Civil Gideon.

